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COMMENTS 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-STRIKE INSURANCE AGREE-
MENTS-Contracts indemnifying persons or corporations for losses 
and damage resulting from an interruption of business due to 
strikes have existed at least since the beginning of this century. 
The Mutual Security Company of Connecticut, for example, wrote 
such a policy for the Buffalo Forge on April 9, 1906.1 In more 
recent times, strike insurance agreements have been instituted in 
major industries, and their impact on collective bargaining has 
been the subject of some controversy. The purpose of this com-
ment is to consider the federal income tax questions which arise 
from such arrangements. Specifically, attention is directed to the 
deductibility of payments constituting the "premium" for strike 
insurance, with particular emphasis on whether such payments are 
connected with the business of the transferor and whether deduc-
tion would frustrate public policy. Consideration is also given to 
the tax treatment of the receipts from a strike insurance con-
tract. Taxation of insurance c~mpanies offering strike insurance 
and reciprocal insurance funds as separate entities is not discussed.2 
Some policies written by insurance companies provide in-
demnity for damage caused by riots at the inception of a strike, 
but exclude coverage for losses due to the interruption of busi-
ness operations. 3 Since these policies are essentially a form of 
casualty insurance, they are not considered in the following discus-
sion. 
I. FORMS OF STRIKE INSURANCE 
There appear to be three possible variations in approach which 
might be contemplated by commercial enterprises seeking to avoid 
l Buffalo Forge Co. v. Mutual Security Co., 83 Conn. 393, 396, 76 Atl. 995, 996 (1910). 
Strike insurance cases decided during the early part of the century, however, did not 
involve tax questions, but rather interpretations of the language of insurance contracts 
and questions of waiver. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Mutual Security Co., supra; Bowers 
&: Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 Atl. 892 (1927) ; Fleet-McGinley Co. v. Both-
well, 143 Md. 324, 122 Atl. 195 (1923) ; Standard Printing &: Publishing Co. v. Bothwell, 
143 Md. 303, 122 Atl. 202 (1923) • 
2 See generally INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501 (c) (15) , 821 (b) ; Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501 (c) (15)-1 (1958); Treas. Reg. § 1.821-1 (1956); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012·2 (c) (2) 
(1958). 
3 See Port Murray Dairy Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 52 N.J. Super. 350, 
145 A.2d 504 (1958) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Prudential Assur. Co., [1959] Can. Sup. Ct. 539, 
18 D.L.R.2d 273 (1959) • 
[474] 
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the risk of the immediate loss of revenue that occurs because of a 
strike. First, an enterprise might enter into an insurance contract 
with an underwriter whose primary business is insurance, such as 
a stock or mutual insurance corporation or a syndicate of under-
writers operating through the Lloyd's of London insurance ex-
change. Second, commercial enterprises may seek to spread the ex-
pense caused by strikes among themselves by making payments to 
a reciprocal insurance fund. Reciprocal insurance is a system 
whereby individuals, partnerships, or corporations engaged in a 
similar line of business indemnify each other against certain kinds 
of losses by way of a mutual exchange of insurance contracts. 
Usually the exchange is through a common attorney-in-fact ap-
pointed by each member under agreements whereby each sepa-
rately becomes both an insured and insurer with several liability 
only.¼ The reciprocal arrangement, including the insurance fund, 
is not a corporation or a partnership although the members and 
attorney-in-fact may be incorporated.5 Third, enterprises within 
an industry might agree that when one or more firms are struck, 
the companies not the target of the strike would make certain pay-
ments directly to the struck firm. 
Newspaper publishers have developed a plan that fits into the 
first category, and approximately four hundred daily newspapers 
have participated for over ten years. The strike insurance is 
written by an unidentified company. The underwriter, however, 
is represented by Lloyd's attorneys in the United States. The 
premium payments vary in proportion to the amount of in-
demnity; they are fixed, however, in the sense that they are not 
subject to any additional assessment. To be eligible for indemnity 
payments, a publisher usually must offer tb arbitrate the strike 
issues. The employers need not, however, offer arbitration when 
the strike concerns any of the following issues except where the 
issue is provided for in the existing labor agreement: news and 
editorial policy, assignment of editors, reporters, or writers, pen-
sion or welfare plans, or union or closed shop agreements. Pay-
ments start on the eighth day after the work stoppage begins and 
continue for varying periods up to a maximum of one hundred 
days depending on the size of the premium. The amount of the 
¼ 2 CoucH, INSURANCE § 18.11 (2d ed. 1959) • See L.O. 1063, 2 CuM. BuLL. 272 (1921) • 
Ii MEHR. 8: CAMMACK, PRINCIPI;E5 OF INSURANCE 60 (3d ed. 1961). 
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proceeds also varies, but the maximum is ten thousand dollars 
per day.6 
Ten major airlines are parties to an arrangement begun in 
October 1958, which clearly fits into the third category, the direct 
payments classification. There is no pre-determined premium 
and no middleman insurer. U nstruck airlines pay to a grounded 
carrier their increased revenues attributable to a strike, minus 
their extra direct expenses. The mutual assistance agreement is 
operative during strikes called to enforce union demands in excess 
of the recommendations of an emergency board established by the 
President of the United States under section 107 of the Railway 
Labor Act, 8 or which do not involve an emergency board if the 
struck carrier has complied with the procedures of the Railway 
Labor Act. Strikes called before the employees have exhausted the 
procedures of that act, or which are otherwise unlawful, also bring 
the plan into operation.9 
The railroads, however, have a strike insurance arrangement 
that is formally within the first category (typical insurance under-
writer contracts) , but could be viewed as substantively within the 
second (reciprocal) or the third (direct payments) category. The 
plan, instituted in August 1959, now has nearly two hundred 
railroads, handling over ninety-nine percent of the freight-ton and 
passenger miles in the United States, participating. Each railroad 
has an insurance policy issued by the Imperial Insurance Com-
6 Confidential informal materials issued by persons closely connected with the news-
paper plan; AFL-CIO American Federationist, March 1961, p. 17; 190 NATION 249 (1960) ; 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1960, p. 10, col. I. 
7 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958). 
s 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1958) • 
9 Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, Docket No. 9977, C.A.B. Order No. E-13899, May 20, 
1959, 1959 Av. L. REP. ,r 22269, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2594 (May 26, 1959), afj'd on recon-
sideration, C.A.B. Order No. E-14563, Oct. 19, 1959, 1959 Av. L. REP. ,r 22317; Composite 
Mutual Aid Agreement as Amended, Nov. 23, 1960; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1960, p. 10, 
col. I. The sugar plantations in Hawaii have an agreement which is similar to the 
airlines plan in that members of the industry make payments directly to each other. 
Losses in revenue during the year of a strike are not compensated, but losses in the 
six following years are covered. The plan operates in this way because cane is allowed 
to grow two years before harvesting. Lack of care during a strike may cause a dis• 
location of planting and harvesting schedules for many years. Each of the participating 
plantations has agreed on a normal production figure. After the strike year, the first 
one-third of "normal" production for each is excluded from coverage. Seventy-five 
percent of the losses beyond this point are compensated. The plan is similar to a 
deductible insurance policy; it is intended to indemnify only in the event of a catas-
trophe. Bus. Week, June 28, 1958, p. 95. 
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pany, Ltd., Nassau, the Bahamas, a capital stock corporation.10 
Strikes covered by the agreement include those contrary to the 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act, strikes to enforce demands 
contrary to the recommendations of an emergency board ap-
pointed by the President, strikes to secure demands that affect 
railroads representing more than fifty percent of the aggregate 
indemnity of all insured railroads provided that an emergency 
board has not been appointed or, if appointed, has failed to make 
definite recommendations. If more than fifty percent of the ag-
gregate indemnity of all roads becomes due on one day, however, 
no indemnity payments are to be made. The policy indemnifies 
a railroad for its fixed expenses as determined by the insured 
railroad at the time of contracting. There is no indemnity for 
variable expenses or lost profits. An initial premium is charged to 
pay for the insurance company's administrative expenses. At the 
time a policy is issued, a railroad is also required to deposit an 
amount equal to one day's indemnity in a Nassau bank. The 
insurer may draw on this amount in the event that later required 
payments are not made. When a strike actually occurs the in-
surance company calls for payments from each non-struck carrier 
in amounts proportional to the daily indemnity of each railroad. 
The middleman insurer used by the railroads, moreover, is not 
a typical insurance corporation. It has no offices apart from its 
right to use the facilities of a Nassau bank. The company employs 
no permanent clerical staff and has no telephone listed in its own 
name. Additionally, the heads of three regional railroad organiza-
tions form an advisory committee to approve claims against the 
insurer, Imperial Insurance.11 With regard to the premiums, 
then, the railroad plan might be said to be in substance a mutual 
assistance contract such as the airlines arrangement, or possibly 
a form of reciprocal insurance. 
II. DEDUCTIBILITY 
Deductibility of the cost, or "premiums," of strike insurance 
is, of course, governed by section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue 
10 Lloyd"s of London has denied that it has any connection with the company. 
N.Y. Times, Sept. IO, 1960, p. 24, col. I. 
11 Jointly prepared record of proceedings and brief for plaintiff, Kennedy v. Long 
Island R.R., Civ. No. 60-3496, S.D.N.Y.; Bus. Week, Sept. 24, 1960, p. 28; Nation's Bus., 
July 1960, pp. 76, 78; National Underwriter, Nov. 13, 1959, p. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 
1960, p. 10, cols. 1, 5; N.Y. Times, July 14, 1959, p. 20, col. 4; Wall St. J., July 13, 
1959, p. 1, col. 6. 
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Code of 1954 which provides for the deduction from gross income 
of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid . . . in carrying 
on any trade or business .... "12 
A. Ordinary, Necessary, and Reasonable 
A business expense is ordinary if persons in similar circum-
stances make the same kind of expenditures.13 The Supreme Court 
has said that "it is the kind of transaction out of which the obliga-
tion arose and its normalcy in the particular business which are 
crucial and controlling."14 Even though an expense is unique 
in the life of a taxpayer, it is ordinary as long as it is not unique 
"in the life of the group, the community of which he is a part."15 
All payments made under the existing strike insurance arrange-
ments would be ordinary under these standards because numerous 
companies in the same line of commerce make similar expendi-
tures. At present, the character of strike insurance expense is the 
same for all members of an industry except for the variation in the 
amount of the payments. 
Expenses must be necessary, as well as ordinary, in order to 
qualify for deduction. An expense need not be necessary in the 
sense that it is indispensable; it must, however, be appropriate and 
helpful to the taxpayer's business. The taxpayer's judgment that 
expenses are necessary usually will prevail.16 
It is well established that payments made to an association 
which seeks to avoid labor disputes or to solve them rapidly are 
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense.17 "Pre-
12 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a) • 
13 Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 1933). 
14 Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1939) • In one insurance case, the Board 
of Tax Appeals held that the premiums in question were neither ordinary, nor neces• 
sary. The main thrust of the opinion, however, is that the payments were not ordinary 
because there was no evidence in the record that the same expenditures had been made 
by any other person in the same business when confronted with similar conditions. 
Herman Goede!, 39 B.T .A. 1 (1939) • 
15 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). 
16 Id. at 113. 
17 Fritz B. Campen, 16 B.T .A. 543 (1929), acq., VIIl-2 CuM. BuLL. 9 (1929); Simons 
Brick Co., 14 B.T.A. 878 (1928), acq. this issue, VIII-2 CUM. BuLL. 48 (1929), afl'd on 
other issues, 45 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 834 (1931) ; Sam H. 
Harris, 11 B.T .A. 871 (1928), acq., VIl-2 CuM. BULL. 17 (1928); George M. Cohan, 
11 B.T .A. 743 (1928), aff'd on other issues, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); H. A. Allen, 
7 B.T .A. 1256 (1927), acq., VII-I CuM. BuLL. 1 (1928); Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 
B.T.A. 1247 (1927), acq., VI-2 CUM. BuLL. 6 (1927), afl'd on other issue, 29 F.2d 262 
(5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 844 (1929); California Brewing Ass'n, 5 B.T .A. 
347 (1926), acq. this issue, VII-I CuM. BuLL. 5 (1928). 
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miums" paid in connection with a strike insurance arrangement 
reasonably can be expected to prevent or shorten strikes suffered 
by the contributor because the "premiums" entitle it to receive 
payments in the event of a strike, and labor unions ought to be 
less willing to undertake or continue a strike if they know that 
its economic pressure will be weakened by these outside payments. 
Thus, strike insurance "premiums," like expenditures to associa-
tions which try to solve labor problems, are designed to prevent 
or alleviate the financial loss that would otherwise result from 
a strike.18 Both types of payments, then, serve to accomplish com-
mon purposes. They ought to be considered equally appropriate 
and helpful to a business. 
Two of the association-payment cases seem to have special 
significance in the area of strike insurance. George M. Cohan19 
and the companion case of Sam H. Harris20 involved a firm that 
was a member of a theatrical producers' association. When the 
association failed to avert an actors' strike, it assessed its members 
to raise a fund to pay counsel fees, for publicity, police protection, 
and "to finance the small producers who could not afford to be 
inactive during the period the strike continued."21 The Board 
of Tax Appeals, in both cases, held that the payments were neces-
sary to the businesses of the contributing producers. Since strike 
insurance payments always have as an end result the financing of 
a company during a strike, Cohan and Harris might be considered 
direct authority for the proposition that the expense of strike 
insurance is "necessary." And it would seem that any member 
of an industry has a business interest in the collective bargaining 
settlement of the first employer to sign a new contract in a period 
of general re-negotiation, especially where pattern bargaining 
18 An employer, however, may be reluctant to make this argument in tax litigation. 
If a strike took place later a union could argue that the employer has admitted stalling 
tactics. Stalling may constitute a breach of the obligation to bargain in good faith 
imposed by §§ 8 (a) (5) and 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (5), 158 (d) (1958). See NLRB v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 
F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953); Stanislaus Implement &: Hardware Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 394 (1952), 
enforced, 226 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1955). The Railway Labor Act, § 2, First & Second, 
48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, First &: Second (1958), imposes an obligation to 
bargain in good faith on railroads and airlines, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181 
(1958) • § 2, Second, of the Railway Labor Act directs that, if possible, disputes be 
decided "with all expedition." 
19 11 B.T .A. 743 (1928) , afl'd on other issues, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) • 
20 11 B.T .A. 871 (1928), acq., VII-2 CUM. Buu.. 17 (1929) • 
21 11 B.T .A. at 748; 11 B.T.A. at 872. (Emphasis added.) 
480 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
prevails. Although the Commissioner of Internal Revenue acqui-
esced in the Harris decision,22 this authority should be viewed with 
some caution. Subsidizing struck producers was only one of the 
purposes of making the payments in question. In addition, over 
thirty years have elapsed since the date of decision and the same 
issue has never been raised in any other litigation. The issue here 
iri question was not relitigated in the appeal from the Cohan de-
cision which is well-known for another reason.23 
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Lincoln 
Electric Co.24 poses an additional problem. Even though the in-
troductory general provision of section 162 (a) contains no express 
requirement of reasonableness, that case holds that the expense 
must be reasonable in amount. The taxpayer involved made pay-
ments on an employee's annuity policy. The court held that the 
payments were not compensation within the scope of the sub-
section of 162 (a) specifically allowing deduction of compensation 
for personal services to the extent that the payments are a 
"reasonable allowance."25 Nevertheless, the court found that 
an element of reasonableness inheres in "ordinary and neces-
sary." The court said, "Clearly it was not the intention 
of Congress to automatically allow as deductions operating 
expenses incurred or paid by the taxpayer in an unlimited 
amount."26 The opinion seems to be concerned with the 
situation where a business taxpayer does not receive full or sub-
stantial value for the money. The justice of a reasonableness 
requirement when there is no close relationship between the tax-
payer and the transferee receiving an expenditure is debatable, 
and the Lincoln Electric decision has been criticized severely.27 
Arguably, premiums for insurance of all kinds could be con-
sidered per se unreasonable if there is no return because no 
occasion for indemnity arises. In the law of contracts, however, 
22 VII-2 CUM. BULL. 17 (1929). 
23 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) . The Second Circuit held 
that absolute certainty of expenses is not required of the taxpayer. A court should make 
as close an approximation as possible. 
24 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949). 
25 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a) (1) [formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247 
§ 23 (a) (1) ]. 
26 176 F.2d at 817. 
27 See Peters, The Lincoln Electric Company Case, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 12 (1949) ; Kil-
cullen, Is Reasonableness a Requirement of Non-Compensation Expenses?, N.Y.U. 9TH 
INST. ON FED. TAX. 863 (1951); Comment, 49 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1951). 
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an insurance agreement is analyzed as an aleatory contract. There 
is no equality of the payments that are promised, but they do 
not constitute the agreed exchange; the exchange of consideration 
is found in the promise to pay a certain premium on the part of 
the insured and the assumption of the risk of paying a certain sum 
on the part of the insurer.28 Insofar as strike insurance "pre-
miums" are to be subjected to a test of reasonableness of amount, 
then, the primary factor should be whether the premiums paid bear 
a rational relationship to the risk assumed. Premiums under the 
newspaper plan vary from 123 dollars for each one hundred 
dollars of indemnity per day up to twenty-five days, to 203 dollars 
for each one hundred dollars of indemnity up to one hundred 
days.29 These ratios hardly seem unreasonable. Because the pre-
mium and indemnity amounts are fixed, a newspaper can pur-
chase strike insurance knowing that deduction of the premiums 
will not be barred because they are unreasonable in amount. On 
the other hand, the premiums paid by railroads holding strike 
insurance are determined on an ad hoc basis and are subject to 
variation because of events outside the control of any particular 
railroad. A railroad, then, cannot be sure that the premiums it 
pays will bear a reasonable relationship to its indemnity coverage 
during a particular year until the end of that year when the 
premiums actually paid can be compared with the indemnity 
coverage during the year. Additionally, only a high ceiling is 
placed on the amount of premium payments that may be required. 
The contract provides that they may be as large as twenty days' 
fixed expenses.30 In September 1960, for example, the New Haven 
Railroad made payments of 100,000 dollars per week to Imperial 
Insurance because of the Pennsylvania Railroad strike.31 The 
problem is even more difficult with respect to the airlines plan. 
Here there is no definite risk assumed by anyone. Because the 
indemnity is based on the application of a formula to profits 
earned by non-struck carriers, not even at the end of a particular 
year could the "premiums" actually paid by a carrier which had 
not suffered a strike during the year be compared with any certain 
indemnity amount. The airlines agreement went into effect 
28 See SIMPSON, CONTRACTS, § 119 (1954) • 
20 Authorities cited note 6 supra. 
30 Authorities cited note 11 supra. 
31 N.Y. Times, Sept. IO, 1960, p. 1, col. 1. 
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during an upsurge of labor trouble. The extreme situation is 
represented by United Airlines. It made payments of four million 
dollars in slightly less than the first two years of the plan's opera-
tion without any occasion arising in which it was entitled to 
receive indemnity payments from other carriers.32 Still, because 
it is apparent that the risk insured by the railroad and airlines 
strike insurance plans is tremendous, whatever "premiums" 
are actually paid should be considered reasonable without any 
showing of the precise premium-indemnity ratio. Moreover, the 
very existence of a strike insurance plan may be the reason why 
a particular insured party suffers no strike. This factor, which 
is probably absent in arrangements for insuring against other 
common risks, is an additional reason for considering the rail-
road and airlines "premiums" reasonable in amount without 
any examination of the actual premium-indemnity ratio. 
B. Connection with Business 
An additional test with regard to deducting a "trade or busi-
ness" expense under section 162 (a) is whether the taxpayer made 
the expenditure for his business. An expense must be directly 
connected with or proximately result from the business of the 
taxpayer.33 In Deputy v. du Pont,34 the taxpayer held stock in the 
du Pont company. For business reasons, the company thought it 
desirable for certain executives to have a financial interest in the 
company. Since legal difficulties stood in the way of the company 
selling the desired number of shares to the executives, the taxpayer-
stockholder undertook to make the sale. The taxpayer did not 
have readily available the number of shares needed, but he bor-
rowed some and agreed to pay the lender the equivalent of all 
dividends declared and paid on the shares. The taxpayer sought to 
deduct his expenditures as expenses of the business of conserv-
ing and enhancing his estate. The Supreme Court held that these 
expenses were not deductible on the ground, inter alia,35 that the 
transaction out of which the carrying charges arose was not within 
32 AFL-CIO American Federationist, March, 1961, pp. 17, 19. 
33 Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928) • 
34 308 U.S. 488 (1940). 
35 The holding was also based on the ground that the payments were not ordinary. 
Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, thought that the decision rested only on this ground. 
308 U.S. at 500-01. 
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the taxpayer's business even though it might benefit the taxpayer 
by improving his investment in the du Pont company. The ex-
pense, rather, was an expense of the du Pont company. 
In one sense, all insurance premiums present a du Pont prob-
lem because a premium usually pays for an expense of another 
business. However, the Treasury Regulations provide that busi-
ness expenses include: "Insurance premiums against fire, storm, 
theft, accident, or other similar losses in the case of a busi-
ness .... " 36 Apparently the du Pont reasoning is not applied to 
insurance, at least in a typical situation. Perhaps this is because 
premium payments may redound to the benefit of the contributor 
in an amount greater than the size of the premium, although they 
are most likely, as far as each contributor is concerned, to benefit 
directly another business.37 The situation, then, is similar to that 
in the cases involving payments or dues to an association that deals 
with labor problems when the money may be used to assist other 
members of the association.38 The value of the benefit received 
may vary from nothing to an amount substantially greater than 
the contribution. 
Because an insurance contract with an underwriter whose pri-
mary business is insurance, such as a stock or mutual insurance 
corporation or a syndicate of Lloyd's underwriters, is the most 
widely used method of insurance, the language of the regulations 
implies that the du Pont principle does not apply to premiums 
paid pursuant to such an arrangement. Du Pont, then, ought not 
to apply to the newspaper plan. Moreover, the fact that ordinary 
insurance premiums are subject to a retrospective increase in 
amount should not vitiate deductibility.39 Looking only at the 
form of the railroad insurance arrangement, du Pont would have 
no application. 
Commercial enterprises which spread the expense caused by 
36 Treas. Reg. §§ I.162-1 (a) (1958) • 
37 In the Cohan opinion, the Board of Tax Appeals said that the payments had a 
"direct relation to the business.'' II B.T.A. at 760. But insofar as the payments in that 
case were to subsidize struck producers, they were made to pay expenses of another busi• 
ness and without any possibility of a similar benefit to the contributor. 
38 The Board of Tax Appeals stated in an early case involving payments to an 
association which dealt with labor problems that the expenditure was "directly con• 
nected with the business" of the taxpayer. Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 B.T .A. 1247, 
1255 (1927) • 
39 See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 27 T.C. 167 (1956), aff'd on other issue, 251 
F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1958) • 
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strikes among themselves by making payments to a reciprocal in-
surance fund probably would not be attacked on the basis of 
du Pont. In a Revenue Ruling, the Commissioner permitted de-
duction of annual payments to a reciprocal insurance fund.40 It 
should be noted, however, that in that ruling the indemnity pay-
ments were made from the reciprocal fund, and were not supple-
mented by ad hoc payments from uninjured parties when an oc-
casion arose calling for indemnity of one party. Thus, if the railroad 
agreement were determined to be in substance a reciprocal 
insurance fund, this precedent would not preclude application of 
the du Pont principle. If a retrospective increase in premium pay-
able to an underwriter is deductible, however, an ad hoc premium 
payable to a reciprocal insurance fund ought to receive the same 
treatment. 
Because of the peculiar nature of strike insurance, however, it 
may not be considered a typical insurance situation either in a 
particular industry or in a particular fact situation-even where 
the form of the insurance arrangement might be considered typ-
ical. This view should be anticipated when an industry-wide 
union regularly sets the pattern for wage scales in the industry 
by threatening to strike an employer who is in a weak position 
to withstand the economic pressure of a strike. It might be 
argued that, although the form of insurance was typical, the 
strike insurance "premiums" paid by a strong member of such 
an industry should be viewed merely as expenditures which pay 
the strike expenses of the weak members. 
If enterprises within an industry agree that when one firm is 
struck, the non-struck companies are to make payments directly 
to the struck firm, the situation is distinguishable from the more 
typical insurance arrangements discussed above because of the ab-
40 Rev. Rul. 55-189, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 265. Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 CUM, 
BULL. 43, however, tested the deductibility of withdrawable premiums paid to a 
reciprocal insurance fund. The contributors were to be indemnified for losses due to 
floods in proportion to the size of the premiums paid. The Internal Revenue Service 
took the position that all contributors would have to be indemnified in the event of a 
flood because they were located in the same geographical area. Because premiums, in 
effect, would be passed back to the original contributor, the premiums were said to 
constitute a nondeductible reserve for self-insurance. The fact that a self-insurance fund 
is administered by an independent agent does not make contributions deductible. Spring 
Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 
654 (1931). The self-insurance problem could be avoided with regard to a reciprocal 
strike insurance fund by providing that no indemnity payments will be made if all 
participants are struck at the same time. 
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sence of any middleman between the insured companies. Because 
the payments in the airlines plan are made directly from the non-
struck carrier to the struck airline, the application of du Pont is 
more likely on the ground that the "premiums" are directly con-
nected with shortening a strike of the recipient airline. Strikes by 
employees of a particular airline are discouraged only by the prom-
ise of other airlines to pay sums to the airline in question in the 
event that it suffers a strike. If the railroad plan is viewed as, in 
substance, a mutual assistance contract essentially similar to the 
airlines agreement, the same problem arises. 
Payments to a struck firm by parties to a mutual assistance con-
tract, nevertheless, should be held to be directly connected with 
the contributor's business for two reasons. First, non-affiliated com-
panies have been permitted to deduct payments made pursuant 
to a contract in which the more profitable parties agreed to con-
tribute the excess of certain earnings to the less profitable parties. 
The payments were found to be directly connected with the busi-
ness on the ground that the pooling agreement was ancillary to a 
contract providing for mutual aid in securing business contracts.41 
A mutual assistance agreement to avoid losses due to strikes has a 
business purpose and, hence, is analogous to the pooling agree-
ment. An airline, however, probably would be reluctant to argue 
that the plan is, in effect, a pooling of profits because that would 
tend to establish an admission that the plan contravenes the policy 
of the antitrust laws.42 Moreover, a railroad might fear this argu-
ment as an admission that its plan is in violation of the Interstate 
Commerce Act proscription of pooling assets without permission 
of the ICC.43 Second, if a mutual assistance contract is in sub-
41 S.M. 5523, V-1 CuM. BULL. 227 (1926). Compare Traylor Eng'r &: Mfg. Co. v. 
Lederer, 271 Fed. 399 (3d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921); Moxa Bldg. Co., 
31 B.T.A. 457 (1934) . 
42 The agreement, like the present airline mutual assistance pact, must be filed with 
the Civil Aeronautics Board. The CAB approves an agreement only if it is in the 
public interest. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1382 (1958) • The public interest requires maintenance of competition. Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (d) (1958). The anti-trust 
laws are one factor considered. Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 853 (1952) • 
Agreements outside this context for the pooling of profits have been held in violation 
of the Sherman Act, § 1, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § l (1958) . See 
Lee Linc Steamers, Inc. v. Memphis, H. &: R. Packet Co., 277 Fed. 5 (6th Cir. 1922) ; 
Delaware, L. &: W. R.R. v. Frank, II0 Fed. 689 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1901). 
43 Sec Interstate Commerce Act § 5 (I), 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1) (1958). 
Sec generally Brief for plaintiff, Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., Civ. No. 60-3496, S.D.N.Y.; 
Walker, Pooling by Carriers, 15 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 282 (1948). 
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stance an insurance contract, the cost should receive the same tax 
treatment as typical insurance premiums. Both the railroad and 
airlines plan are in substance an insurance agreement.44 They 
both involve a shifting and distribution of risk, the main charac-
teristics of insurance according to the Supreme Court.45 Tax.pay-
ers, after all, may utilize the doctrine of substance over form46 even 
though the Commissioner is its usual proponent.47 
C. Public Policy 
Another problem stems from the fact that the legality of strike 
insurance is not entirely certain. A rule developed by the judiciary 
prohibits deduction of payments as ordinary and necessary ex-
penses if allowing them would frustrate a sharply defined policy 
of national or state government. The bar to deductibility is not 
limited to fines, but extends to private transactions in which pay-
ments are illegal. While emphasis is placed on the peculiar facts 
of each case, the test of nondeductibility is the severity and im-
mediacy of the frustration resulting from the allowance of a de-
duction.48 A remote relation of an expenditure to an illegal act, 
however, will not result in nondeductibility.49 
I. Legality of Strike Insurance 
Doing business by offering or writing strike insurance has been 
declared informally to be contrary to the policy of the State of 
New York. On August 2, 1956, Jacob Javits, then Attorney Gen-
eral of New York, stated to a newspaper union that he had been 
advised by the Insurance Department that applications for li-
censes50 to write strike insurance had been rejected on the ground 
that approval of such coverage would be "contrary to public pol-
icy."51 New York defines insurance broadly enough to include 
reciprocal insurance and a mutual assistance plan, as well as a 
44 Cf. Joseph Nussbaum, 19 B.T .A. 868 (1930). 
45 Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941). 
46 E.g., Pressed Steel Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953) • 
47 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
48 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Lilly v. Com· 
missioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). 
49 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 
U.S. 467, 474 (1943). 
50 See generally N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 40-45. 
111 190 NATION 249, 250 (1960) ; Editor & Publisher, Aug. 18, 1956, p. 66. 
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typical insurance arrangement with a stock or mutual insurance 
corporation or an individual underwriter.112 The New York Insur-
ance Law provides authorization for the writing of only certain 
types of insurance. Strike insurance does not fit within any of the 
categories in section 46, the authorizing provision.53 It should be 
noted, however, that the penalties for violating section 46 would 
apply only to insurers and those acting in their behalf.114 In a re-
ciprocal insurance exchange or a mutual assistance agreement, 
however, each member is an insurer as well as an insured party 
and, thereby, would seem to be subject to the penalties imposed 
for violation of the statute. 
Strike insurance also may be contrary to federal legislation. An 
airlines agreement substantially the same as the present plan115 
was tested in Six Mutual Aid Pact,r,6 decided by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board in 1959. The plan was approved except for a provi-
sion which required the struck airlines to direct traffic to other 
non-struck signatories. Jurisdiction was based on section 412 of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958117 which requires every air carrier 
to submit any agreement affecting air transportation to the Board. 
The Board is required to disapprove all agreements that it finds 
to be adverse to the public interest and to approve all that are 
not.118 In Six Mutual Aid Pact the Board looked to other federal 
112 See N.Y. INs. LA.w §§ 41, 410, 425. 
llS N.Y. INS. LA.w § 46. Insurance for damage to property caused by riots at the 
inception of a strike probably would be permitted by the statute. See N.Y. INs. LA.w 
§ 46(14). 
ll4 See Akers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 273, 112 N.Y. Supp. 254 (Sup. Ct. 
1908) • An insurance policy in violation of statutory provisions, moreover, is binding 
upon the insurer. See N.Y. !Ns. LA.w § 143 (I). 
1111 The airlines agreement was expanded in March 1960 to include four more carriers. 
The plan was revised to include strikes in which the President does not find it necessary 
to appoint an emergency board, provided that the struck carrier has complied with the 
procedures of the Railway Labor Act. The unions have asked the CAB to disapprove 
the expanded agreement on the theory that the plan is now applicable to all strikes 
and extends beyond what the airlines justified when the CAB approved the plan 
originally. See Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, Docket No. 9977, C.A.B. Order No. E-13899, 
May 20, 1959, 1959 Av. L. REP. 11 22269, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2594 (May 26, 1959), aff'd on 
reconsideration, C.A.B. Order No. E-14563, Oct. 19, 1959, 1959 Av. L. REP. 11 22317. The 
CAB has ordered new hearings (Order No. E-15413) • Nation's Bus., July 1960, p. 76; 
N.Y. Times, April 13, 1960, p. 78, col. 6. 
116 Note 55 supra. Commentaries have thoroughly explored and questioned the deci-
sion. See Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 
LA.w &: C0NTEMP. PROB. 22, 37-40 (1960); Comment, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 205 (1960); 
Note, 35 IND. L.J. 491 (1960). 
117 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (a) (1958). 
118 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (b) (1958). 
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legislation, as well as other sections of the act in considering the 
public interest. Three contentions that the plan was contrary to 
the Railway Labor Act were rejected. It was argued that the agree-
ment repudiated the act's requirement that collective bargaining 
be in good faith, 59 brought into a labor dispute air carriers which 
were not proper parties,60 and forced unions to accept recommen-
dations of a presidential emergency board. Moreover, the Federal 
Aviation Act specifically provides that it is in the public interest 
to have "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound 
development"61 of the industry. The Board decided that the agree-
ment arose from business requirements, that there was no intent 
to monopolize, and that there would be no substantial lessening of 
competition. On the other hand, the provision of the agreement 
restricting direction of traffic was ordered deleted on the ground 
that it was repugnant to established antitrust principles. The 
Board also rejected contentions that the plan violates section I 02 
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.62 According to the Board, 
this section requires it to guard the public interest in stability and 
efficiency of air transportation that freedom from labor strife pro-
vides. 63 
The railroad strike insurance plan is in the process of attack in 
litigation before the federal district court for the Southern District 
of New York in the case of Kennedy v. Long Island R.R.64 The 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen brought the suit against sev-
eral railroads and the Association of American Railroads. The suit 
has been brought as a class action to recover damages resulting 
from a twenty-six day strike of the Long Island beginning in July 
1960.65 The plaintiffs offer five arguments: 66 (I) the Long Island 
Rail Road's participation in the strike insurance plan was a vio-
lation of its duty to bargain in good faith; (2) the Long Island 
59 48 Stat. 1187 (1934) , 45 U.S.C. § 152, First &: Second (1958) • 
60 See 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1958). 
61 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (d) (1958). 
62 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958). 
63 The Board also rejected the argument that the subsidy mail pay program under 
§ 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 763, 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1958), would 
cause federal funds to be used to break a strike if a subsidized carrier became a party 
to the agreement. The Board disposed of this contention on the ground that it was 
premature because no subsidized carrier was currently a party to the agreement. 
64 Civ. No. 60-3496, S.D.N.Y. 
65 See jointly prepared record of proceedings, Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 
supra note 64. 
66 See Brief for plaintiff, ibid. 
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introduced an element of multi-party bargaining without the con-
sent of the plaintiffs; (3) the defendants other than the Long 
Island conspired to and tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's 
statutory collective bargaining rights and induced a violation of 
these rights by the Long Island; (4) the strike insurance plan is 
an illegal pooling of revenues by competing carriers without the 
permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission; (5) the strike 
insurance plan is an attempt to fix the price of railway labor which 
is a combination in restraint of trade prohibited by section I of 
the Sherman Act. 61 
Some of the language of the Civil Aeronautics Board in Six 
Mutual A id Pact supports the argument that the railroad plan 
contravenes the obligation of an employer to bargain in good faith. 
The Board's rejection of the argument that the airlines agreement 
repudiated the duty to bargain in good faith was in part based on 
a rejection of the argument that the operation of the plan would 
prolong the settlement of disputes. The Board said that, even 
though strikes were compensable under the agreement, they would 
continue to cause significant losses. In concluding that a struck 
airline would not be complacent about settlement the Board said: 
"It is noteworthy that payments under the agreement do not re-
coup a struck carrier's fixed costs, or its extraordinary expenses."68 
The recoupment of the struck carrier's fixed expenses, however, 
is exactly what the railroad agreement provides. 
2. Application of Public Policy Doctrine 
The issues that will determine the legality of strike insurance 
raised above suggest four problems that may arise with respect to 
the application of the rule against deducting payments that con-
travene public policy. 
Declarations by Administrative Agencies. The first question is 
whether a determination by an administrative agency that a strike 
insurance plan is illegal involving discretion on the part of the 
administrative body would be a sufficient declaration of govern-
mental policy to bar deductibility of payments that had been made 
under the insurance agreement. 69 The decisions indicate that there 
61 50 Stat. 693 (1937) , as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955) , 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) . 
68 1959 Av. L. REP. 1J 22269, p. 14479. 
69 While this problem is suggested by the submission of the airlines strike insurance 
plan (before amendment) to the Civil Aeronautics Board, it should be noted that the 
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is no general principle that would be applicable. Various factors 
have been emphasized in the decisions allowing deduction of ad-
ministratively-determined compromise settlements for apparently 
illegal conduct and payments made in violation of regulations 
promulgated by administrative agencies. The courts have empha-
sized the insignificance of the amount,70 the inadvertence of the 
taxpayer and precautions taken to avoid violation,71 the taxpayer's 
voluntary disclosure,72 sporadic enforcement of the regulation,73 
and approval by authorities in spite of a prohibitive regulation.7~ 
In denying deductions, the courts have noted that regulations 
clearly stated a rigid criterion of public policy,75 that regulations 
of the administrative agency were given the full force and effect 
of law by a statutory provision,76 and that there was a lack of evi-
dence showing inadvertence and the taking of reasonable precau-
tions to avoid illegal conduct.77 Thus, there are some guides for 
a court to follow. None of those already enunciated, however, 
seem particularly appropriate to the strike insurance problem. It 
seems likely that deduction of strike insurance "premiums" that 
had been declared illegal by an administrative body exercising dis-
cretion would depend in large part on the imagination of counsel 
in presenting arguments that are appropriate to the character of 
the particular strike insurance arrangement and administrative 
ruling. 
Absence of State Sanctions for Taxpayer. A second problem 
would arise in a situation where strike insurance is clearly not au-
thorized by the law of a state applicable to a strike insurance con-
tract or the insurer under the contract, but where the penalties 
imposed for violation of the statute apply only to the insurer and 
plan always has provided for automatic termination in the event of disapproval by the 
Board so that, in any event, there would be no "premiums" paid after the administrative 
declaration of illegality. Composite Mutual Aid Agreement as Amended, Nov. 23, 1960. 
70 Farmers Creamery Co., 14 T.C. 879, 883 (1950) (amount was $867.20). 
71 National Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950); 
Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949); Pacific Mills, 17 T.C, 
705 (1951). Compare Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); 
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
72 Farmers Creamery Co., 14 T.C. 879, 883 (1950). 
73 See Polley v. Westover, 77 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D. Cal. 1948) • 
74 Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl, Inc., 11 T.C. 1030, 1034-36 (1948) . 
75 See Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., 16 T.C. 1312, 1318 (1951) (alternative ground) • 
76 Fred D. Newman, 21 P·H TAX CT. MEM. 809, Bll (1952), relying on Lovett v. 
State, 30 Ala. App. 334, 6 So. 2d 437 (1941), interpreting ALA. CODE tit. 29, § 52 (1940) • 
77 Henry Watterson Hotel Co., 15 T.C. 902 (1950) ; Garibaldi &: Cuneo, 9 T.C. «6 
(1947). 
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not to the insured. For example, if a New York company entered 
a strike insurance contract with a New York underwriter and no 
reciprocal insurance or mutual assistance arrangement was in-
volved, the insured company would not be subject to penalties. 
Could the premiums paid by the insured be deducted as a business 
expense on the ground that public policy is not frustrated? Two 
arguments have been advanced for allowance of a deduction when 
the law imposes no sanctions on the taxpayer for a proscribed pay-
ment.78 The legislature in such a case has not seen fit to punish 
the taxpayer at all, and it would be difficult to conclude that al-
lowing a deduction would frustrate a specific legislative intent. 
Additionally, a rule denying deduction would tend to frustrate 
public policy by discouraging disclosure of the payments. There 
appears to be no authority in point.79 Allowance of the deduction, 
however, is suggested by language of the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Heininger.80 In allowing a taxpayer to deduct the 
attorneys' fees he incurred in opposing a fraud order by the Post-
master General, the Court observed: "The single policy of these 
sections [of the statute permitting the order] is to protect the pub-
lic from fraudulent practices committed through the use of the 
mails. It is not their policy to impose personal punishment on 
violators .... "81 Although the Heininger case is factually quite 
different from the case of proscribed payments for which there are 
no sanctions, the language suggests that deductibility is to be de-
nied only when an aim of the governmental policy in question is 
to punish the taxpayer. 
Application of State Law to Multi-State Agreements. Another 
problem which the Commissioner may face in determining 
whether a strike insurance agreement frustrates the public policy 
of a particular state is the extent to which the law of that state 
should be applied to situations in which the binding fore~ of that 
law is called into question on the basis of conflict of laws rules or 
constitutional limitations. The problem is most likely to arise 
when a company desiring strike insurance is located in a state 
which proscribes the making of strike insurance agreements and 
78 See Note, 51 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 752, 759 (1951) • 
79 The existence of authority is implied in Note, 51 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 752, 759, n.57 
(1951), but the cases therein cited deal with the distinguishable problem of cost of 
goods sold. 
80 320 U.S. 467 (1943). 
81 Id. at 474. 
492 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
the insurer is located outside the state. To put the problem in a 
more concrete context, assume that the insurer has not done any 
business within the hostile state; that the contract was negotiated 
and concluded in another state or foreign country which is not 
adverse to strike insurance; that the contract provides that all pre-
miums will be paid and the contract otherwise performed outside 
the state; and that the parties intend that the law of the hospitable 
state or country should be applied to the contract. The power of 
a state to regulate and to apply its own law depends generally upon 
the suostantiality of the contacts between it and the transaction 
involved, and in the situation posed the question of the application 
of the law of the hostile state can occur in three different concep-
tual settings: first, whether the hostile state may constitutionally 
regulate insurers whose principal operations are outside the 
state;82 second, whether the hostile state should apply its own 
law to a suit upon the strike insurance contract under conflict of 
laws rules;83 and third, whether application of its own law to 
the contract would violate constitutional limitations.84 
The Supreme Court has not yet held that the hostile state 
would have the power to regulate the insurer or the performance 
of the contract in the situation posed.85 Certiorari, however, 
recently has been granted in a case involving attempted regulation 
in a situation nearly identical to the facts of the hypothetical case 
suggested here.86 In a 1943 opinion, Hoopeston Canning Co. v. 
Cullen,87 the Supreme Court held that New York could regulate 
a foreign insurer who did not even enter into insurance con-
tracts within New York; the basis for New York regulation 
82 See generally 12 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §§ 7071-95 (1943). 
83 See generally 19 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §§ 10321-52 (1946). 
84 See generally Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a 
State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449 (1959) . 
85 Although looked upon with disfavor by the Supreme Court in recent decisions, 
the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) , has not yet been overruled. In 
that case it was held unconstitutional for Louisiana to penalize the insured on an 
out-of-state insurance contract. The only contacts with Louisiana were that the property 
insured was temporarily within the state and the policyholder notified the insurer 
from that state. 
86 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 340 S.W .2d 339 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 
1960), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 810 (1961). The State of Texas, pursuant to statute, 
taxed premiums paid on an insurance policy covering property located in the state. 
The property was used by its owner in doing business within the state. Texas had 
no other contacts with the insurance contract. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas 
reluctantly held the tax unconstitutional. 
87 318 U.S. 313 (1943). Compare Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) • 
1962] COMMENTS 493 
being that the insured property was located permanently with-
in the state and that the insurer had been licensed to do busi-
ness within the state in the past and its representatives entered the 
state to inspect the insured property. The language of Hoopeston 
seems to go beyond its holding, but in any event it would be 
distinguishable from a strike insurance arrangement in which the 
only contact with the hostile state is the permanent location of 
the interest insured. 
With regard to the conflict of laws problem and the constitu-
tional limitations on a hostile state to apply its own law to invali-
date a contract valid where entered, the language of a recent Su-
preme Court opinion suggests that liberal treatment will be given 
with respect to the number of contacts required. In Watson v. 
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.88 the state in which the user of a 
home permanent preparation was injured was permitted to apply 
its own statute allowing a direct action against the insurer despite 
a contrary clause in the seller's insurance contract which, in this 
case, had been entered and entirely performed in states permitting 
the agreement. Even in Watson, however, the insurer had an ad-
ditional contact with the hostile state in that it was licensed and 
doing other business within the state. Even though there is a trend 
toward liberality in permitting application of the law of the 
forum to insurance contracts, 89 it is not clear at this point that 
the state's policy can constitutionally apply. If a hostile state's 
law is not applicable, deduction of course cannot properly be 
said to frustrate a policy of the state. 
A different aspect of the same problem would be presented if 
a suit was brought on the hypothetical strike insurance contract 
suggested above in a court of the hostile state, and the court dis-
missed the action, as it may pursuant to the Constitution,90 not 
because its internal law is applicable, but because the contract is 
contrary to its public policy. In this situation the contract is not 
illegal or unenforceable in the sense that it is proscribed by ap-
plicable law. The hostile state is merely unwilling to lend its 
courts to enforcement of the contract. The absence of a direct ap-
88 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Compare Hartford Acc. &: Indemn. Co. v. Delta &: Pine Land 
Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
89 See generally Lenhoff, Conflict Avoidance in Insurance, 21 LA.w &: CONTEMP. PROB. 
549 (1956), 1957 INS. L.J. 101. 
90 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) • 
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plication of the hostile law to the contract and the lack of any 
penalty or damages when an action is dismissed provide arguments 
for allowing deduction of the premiums. This problem, of course, 
could be avoided entirely if the parties litigated any questions 
arising under the contract in a non-hostile state. 
In any event, since there is no Supreme Court authority for 
the proposition that the hostile state may regulate the insurer 
or apply its own law to the contract in the strike insurance 
arrangement posed hypothetically, the premiums paid should not 
be subject to the rule against deducting expenses that are con-
trary to public policy. 
Problems arising from the conflict of laws rule applicable to 
strike insurance contracts are likely to be of more than theoretical 
relevance. The railroads are utilizing a foreign insurance com-
pany, one located in Nassau, the Bahamas.91 The newspaper pub-
lishers may be using a foreign insurer as well since premiums are 
paid by the insured newspapers to the Montreal Trust Company 
in escrow for the unidentified insurer.92 The airlines plan, of 
course, involves no payments to an insurance company or fund. 
Unsettled Public Policy in Tax Litigation. A fourth question 
may arise from the fact that strike insurance has not been declared 
officially unlawful by any state or federal governmental authority. 
The legal questions, of course, are not yet settled. If deduction of 
91 Authorities cited at note 11 supra. It should be noted, however, that if an alien 
insurer is used as in the railroad plari there is an additional federal tax consequence. 
A documentary stamp tax is imposed by the federal government. Strike insurance clearly 
would be classified as "casualty insurance," and the tax consequently would be four 
cents on each dollar of the premium charged. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4371-72. The 
duty to pay the tax is imposed on any person for whom or in whose name the policy 
is written, or his solicitor or broker. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4374. Any such trans• 
action, moreover, is also subject to possible taxation by the country in which the alien 
insurer does its business in connection with the transaction. On the other hand, use 
of an alien insurer that is not doing business in the United States is a way of avoiding 
taxes on premiums by the state where the insured is domiciled or doing business. The 
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not permit a state to levy a tax on 
premiums paid by such an insured if the contract is entered outside the United States, 
premiums are paid and the contract is otherwise to be performed outside the United 
States, the insurer is not doing other business within the state, and the insurer does 
not have direct contacts with the insured within the state. Compania General De Tabacos 
de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87 (1927) • Accord, State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Ship• 
yards Corp., 340 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1960), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 810 (1961). 
See generally 41 HARV. L. REv. 390 (1928) ; 26 MICH. L. REv. 803 (1928) • Compare 
Continental Assur. Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5 (1940); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938). 
92 Confidential materials, supra note 6. 
1962] COMMENTS 495 
strike insurance "premiums" was denied by the Commissioner on 
the ground of frustration of public policy and the taxpayer liti-
gated the deduction, the court deciding the tax question would 
not have before it any clear judicial interpretation of the relevant 
non-tax statutes. A court, particularly one as specialized as the Tax 
Court, might be reluctant to undertake the complicated task of 
statutory interpretation and weighing of evidence necessary to 
determine whether a non-tax statute was violated merely to justify 
denial of a tax deduction. Moreover, the public policy tax cases 
refer to a "sharply defined" policy.93 The broad terms of the fed-
eral statutes which may bear on strike insurance are the antithesis 
of a sharp definition. To grant or deny a deduction on the basis 
of whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous, however, 
would not provide a standard of any reliability. An approach that 
appears to avoid serious difficulties would be for the court to say 
that it will not pass on whether the evidence presented shows that the 
taxpayer actually was violating the statute, but, for purposes of de-
duction, to the best of its knowledge the payments do or do not 
violate the policy of the uninterpreted non-tax statute.94 This 
should avoid use of the tax decision as direct authority in a similar 
case brought directly for violation of the non-tax statute involved. 
Additionally, it could not then be said that the federal tax laws 
encourage any frustration of federal or state governmental policy. 
Moreover, this approach would avoid the problem of discrimina-
tory treatment of taxpayers that otherwise would be presented if 
the taxpayer in question had not been sued or prosecuted under 
the non-tax statute for purely practical reasons. 
III. PROCEEDS 
Indemnity payments received by a struck firm pursuant to a 
strike insurance agreement can be expected to be classified as 
"gross income" under section 61 (a) .95 Subsection 2 of that pro-
vision specifically provides that gross income includes "gross 
income derived from business ... ,"96 and it seems clear that insur-
93 E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 96 (1951). 
94 This approach was taken in a recent Tax Court case involving the old § 302 
of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 157 (1947) • See Basil 
Christodoulou, 1962 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. &: Mem. Dec. ,i 62004. 
95 INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a) . 
96 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a) (2) . 
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ance proceeds are ordinary income if they represent reimburse-
ment for loss of income resulting from injury to the business. But 
if part or all of the proceeds are used to replace property damaged 
in the course of the strike (e.g., through violence, lack of use, or 
by the process of shutting down operating facilities), a taxpayer 
may be able to claim pro tanto non-recognition under the provi-
sions of section 1033 (a) w by drawing an analogy to the treatment 
of use and occupancy insurance proceeds under that section.98 
Like strike insurance, use and occupancy insurance indemni-
fies a business against losses incurred through the interruption of 
its operations; it differs from strike insurance in that the risk in-
sured against is interruption of the use of specific property due 
to a casualty loss such as fire or explosion. Section 1033 (a), pro-
viding for the non-recognition of gain realized by the involuntary 
conversion of property, may be applied by the taxpayer to use and 
occupancy proceeds when they are expended in the acquisition of 
property similar or related in service to the property destroyed, 00 
even though it is not the property as such that is insured but only 
its use.100 In such cases, the taxpayer is accorded non-recognition if 
his indemnity contract provides for payment of a fiat per diem 
allowance from the date the property is destroyed to the time when 
replacement could be made and operations resumed with the use 
of ordinary diligence. On the other hand, section 1033 (a) is not 
applied to the proceeds of a use and occupancy insurance contract 
when the language of the policy is in terms of indemnity for loss 
of net profits. The "profits" language seems to stand in the way of 
finding an involuntary conversion of property, and such proceeds 
are always classified as gross income under section 61 (a) .101 
07 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033 (a) , 
98 See Merritt, Taxation of Proceeds of Use and Occupancy, or Business Interruption, 
Insurance, 1954 INS. L.J. 475. 
99 Williams Furniture Corp., 45 B.T.A. 928 (1941), acq., 1942-1 CUM. BULL, 17; 
Flaxlinum Insulating Co., 5 B.T.A. 676 (1926), acq., VI-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (1927), with-
drawn & nonacq., X-1 CUM. BULL. 79 (1931), withdrawn & acq., 1942-1 CUM. BULL, 6; 
Piedmont-Mt. Airy Guano Co., 3 B.T.A. 1009 (1926), acq., V-2 CuM. BULL. 3 (1926), 
withdrawn & nonacq., X-1 CuM. BULL. 89 (1931), withdrawn & acq., 1942-1 CUM. BULL, 13, 
100 Piedmont-Mt. Airy Guano Co., supra note 99. "The use of a certain object or 
thing belonging to a person is an indispensable part of that individual's property in 
the object or thing." Id. at 1015. 
101 Miller v. Hocking Glass Co., 80 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 
659 (1936); Oppenheim's, Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Mich. 1950) (issue 
III); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 15 T.C. 79 (1950) (issue 2); Treas. Reg, 
§ 1.1033 (a) -3.1033 (f) (1957) ; 0.D. 645, 3 CUM. BULL. 89 (1920) • 
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Both the newspaper and railroad strike insurance contracts 
specify a daily indemnity that is not affected by the size of lost 
profits. Thus, proceeds received by a struck newspaper or railroad 
would be more analogous to the flat per diem amount classification 
of use and occupancy insurance proceeds than to the category for 
reimbursement of the loss of net profits. Nevertheless, in most 
situations, the proceeds of both plans, by analogy, would be classi-
fied as income because ordinarily there will be little or no prop-
erty destroyed as a result of a strike which could be replaced with 
the proceeds. 
The application of the use and occupancy insurance analogy 
to the airlines mutual assistance agreement, however, involves a 
different problem. The proceeds are clearly not a flat per diem 
amount. On the other hand, they are not an estimate of lost profits 
or computed from the past profits of the airline suffering a strike. 
If the taxpayer argued non-recognition of certain proceeds, it seems 
likely that the Commissioner would use the fact that the "pre-
miums" are based on increased profits of non-struck carriers as an 
argument that the proceeds are more analogous to a reimburse-
ment of lost profits than to a flat per diem amount. 
All in all, it is unlikely that a struck airline could treat the 
funds it received in any other way than as income. The payments 
received could not be classified as a gift.102 To qualify as a gift, a 
transfer must be voluntary and without consideration; it must not 
be made in discharge of a legal or moral obligation.103 Still, the 
question whether a transfer is a gift ultimately must be based on 
the experience the trier of fact has had with human conduct.104 
However, the fact that the airlines payments are made pursuant to 
contract and, hence, for consideration ought to answer the ques-
tion. 
Even if strike insurance proceeds are recognized as income, 
expenditures from them will be deductible under section 162 (a) 
if they are ordinary and necessary business expenses. Of course, 
102 If money received by a taxpayer is "property acquired by gift," INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, § 102 (a) excludes it from gross income, and it receives more favorable tax treat-
ment than ordinary income. Compare INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2502 with INT. R.Ev. 
CODE OF 1954, § 1. 
103 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 
U.S. 28 (1949) ; Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Old Colony Trust Co. 
v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
104 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960), discussed in 59 MrcH. L. 
REV. 321 (1960) • 
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if the proceeds are used to purchase capital items they could not 
be deducted immediately, but would be depreciable over the life 
of the assets.105 Thus, the effect of the income-recognition ques-
tion will usually be reflected in the time at which tax.es are 
paid rather than the amount that is due eventually. Non-recogni-
tion, of course, usually would be preferable because it allows the 
taxpayer to use the funds that would otherwise be paid to the 
Treasury as a tax on strike insurance proceeds in the period from 
the date the income tax is paid until the date when a deduction 
can be taken on a tax return. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In brief, deductibility of the cost of strike insurance seems 
likely, at least at the present time. It is, however, open to some 
question and, of course, will be affected by judicial developments 
in the application of non-tax statutes to strike insurance. Indem-
nity payments, the "proceeds" of strike insurance, can be expec-
ted to be treated as ordinary income, at least in the typical situ-
ation. 
Deduction of strike insurance "premiums," however, is prob-
ably crucial to the continued existence of the present strike insur-
ance arrangements. Without deductibility the dollars spent by a 
corporation for strike insurance would be worth only one half as 
much as dollars spent for other items that are deductible, because 
of the fifty-two percent corporate tax rate.106 
For better or worse, strike insurance is related to a problem 
that gives rise to strong feelings-the collective bargaining process 
and the balance of power between labor and management. Hope-
fully, the courts will not allow themselves to be influenced in any 
way by personal views in charting the development of tax law 
theories when they decide the tax questions presented by the busi-
ness relationships classified as strike insurance. 
105 See INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167, 263. 
106 See INT. REY. CODE- OF 1954, § 11. 
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